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Between 1905 and 1907, financier Clarence Mackay purchased 
some five percent of AT&T’s outstanding shares, giving him four times 
as much stock as the next largest owner.1  Such a large stake, Mackay 
argued, entitled him to representation on the company’s board of direc-
tors.  As Mackay wrote to AT&T president Frederick P. Fish, “[N]ot one 
of your eighteen Directors . . . owns over 2,000 shares of your stock in 
his own right . . . .”2  Control rested in the hands of AT&T managers.  
Thirty-six percent of the stock was in the company treasury, voted by the 
AT&T directors through a trust agreement.  Directors voted an even 
higher percentage when proxies were added in.3  Mackay had pointedly 
raised the issue of control in a corporation composed of numerous stock-
holders.  It was an issue that would grow enormously important in the 
coming decades with AT&T as one of the central firms in the debate 
over who had the right to control and manage big firms. 
After consulting with other AT&T directors, Fish penned a lengthy 
reply.  Each director, he wrote, had an obligation to serve “each and all 
of the stockholders,” and it was “unwise to have any stock interest spe-
cifically represented on the Board.”  This was somewhat disingenuous 
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 1. FCC, Telephone Investigation, Special Investigation Docket No. 1: Report on Control of 
Telephone Communications, vols. 62–63, pp. 35–39, 41 (1937) [hereinafter FCC Investigation]. 
 2. Id. at 41. 
 3. Id. at 30, 49. 
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because AT&T had several constituencies on its board.  As Mackay 
noted, for example, the telegraph giant Western Union owned just 20% 
of the stock of New York Telephone (a large AT&T subsidiary), yet held 
five of thirteen directorships.4  But most outrageous, in Mackay’s opi-
nion, was what he termed Fish’s “new theory” that a large owner was 
somehow disqualified from management.  By that logic, Mackay scoffed, 
“it would be better if the directors own no stock whatsoever, which, of 
course, is contrary to the theory on which corporations . . . are orga-
nized.”5 
On its face, then, this seems a clear case of an owner losing control 
to managers.  In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means would use AT&T as a prime example of what 
they saw as a dangerous new trend, the replacement of ownership-based 
capitalism with giant corporations controlled by a small group of proper-
tyless managers.  Indeed, AT&T became Berle and Means’ favorite ex-
ample.  In the 1930s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
would interpret the Mackay incident in a like manner: an example of the 
separation of ownership and management and subsequent loss of control 
by owners. 
Statistics seem to paint a clear picture of the process whereby own-
ers lost control of AT&T.  In 1900, the telephone corporation had about 
7,000 shareholders.6  By 1920, shareholders had increased to 140,000, 
and were well over 400,000 by the time Berle and Means’ famous book 
appeared in 1932.  This growth in shareholders, Berle and Means argued, 
was one way that owners lost control of their property.  The decline of 
ownership concentration at AT&T told the same story: dispersing shares 
across many owners, each of whom only had a small ownership percen-
tage.  The average shareholder owned 67 AT&T shares in 1911, but only 
35 shares by 1920.  Eighty-five to ninety percent of shareholders owned 
100 or fewer shares over that same period.7  As Mackay observed, direc-
tors’ and officers’ personal ownership stakes were low, only 2% by 
1905.8  With few managers owning any significant number of shares, 
AT&T seemed a perfect example of the emerging trend of managerial 
capitalism. 
As we shall see, however, the claim that AT&T was a leading ex-
ample of the separation of ownership from management is incomplete.  
More importantly, the common interpretation of Berle and Means’ work 
                                                 
 4. Id. at 41–42. 
 5. Id. at 43. 
 6. Id. at 26. 
 7. See AT&T, ANNUAL REPORTS (1911–1920). 
 8. FCC Investigation, supra note 1, at 22–23, 25, 39, 49. 
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is mistaken, placing the emphasis incorrectly on the number of share-
holders and reading modern concerns over conflict between principals 
(owners) and agents (managers) into the past.  In fact, AT&T was quite 
exceptional in number of shareholders and lack of ownership concentra-
tion.  Compared to other nations, the United States lagged in the use of 
the stock market and many American firms retained substantial family 
ownership.  A close look at The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty shows a rather different set of concerns than those underscored in 
contemporary agency theory.  Principal-agent conflict was only part of 
Berle and Means’s story, and not the most important part.  The problem 
the book tackled was not separation of ownership and management, lead-
ing to principal-agent conflict.  Rather it was the problem of the separa-
tion of ownership and control.  Control pointed to a new set of issues 
about power and responsibility in an economic institution—the mana-
gerial corporation—that had grown in size and taken over substantial 
areas of economic activity. 
Berle and Means brought popular attention to an issue of power in 
the modern corporation that continues to be debated until the present.  
Yet, over time, their insights were lost in economic theories that placed 
almost exclusive emphasis on efficiency rather than power.  The results 
were, by the 1970s, corporate policies that sought to correct the problem 
of principal-agent conflict in ways that greatly exacerbated the problem 
that Berle and Means had warned was far larger—the ability of insiders 
to control corporate property and use it in ways detached from issues of 
social responsibility. 
BERLE AND MEANS IN THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Few works by economists have enjoyed wider circulation than 
Berle and Means’s classic text The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.  Indeed, it has attracted historians, economists, policy makers, 
and the popular press, all of whom accepted its thesis on the separation 
of ownership and management in the modern corporation.  More than 
fifty years after publication, it was being cited by financial economists as 
the starting point for their own inquiries into agency conflicts.9  Yet, the 
text they understand is not the one that Berle and Means actually wrote.  
Almost from the moment it appeared, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property was read in ways that ignored its central thesis about cor-
porate power and responsibility. 
                                                 
 9. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288 
(1980).  Robert Hessen called it “a living classic” in 1983.  See Robert Hessen, The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J. L. & ECON. 273 (1983). 
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Such readings began with economist Robert Gordon.  In his 1930s 
articles and his 1945 book, Business Leadership in the Large Corpora-
tion, Gordon set the tone for the “managerial” interpretation of Berle and 
Means’ text that would soon follow.10  Gordon argued that the firm was 
composed of various interests and stakeholders, including managers.  
Power was a matter of balance and competition among these groups.  
This was not strictly in line with Berle and Means’ original intent.  In-
deed, as Means responded, it seriously slighted the problem of control.  
To Berle and Means, “manager” was not a category of identity but the 
residue of power.  Whoever could set corporate policy was a manager, 
and whoever managed by definition had control.11  The central question 
was thus how control was obtained. 
But beginning with Gordon, managers and management were re-
duced to just one faction among many.  They were not distinguished by 
control (the “control group” Berle and Means termed them) but recog-
nized by their roles and characteristics.  Managers were skilled profes-
sionals responsible for firm strategy and operations.  They had their in-
terests, to be sure, but their power could be checked by banks, large 
shareholders, and when it came to implementing decisions, even lower 
level employees.12 
Gordon’s perspective placed agency theory at the center of Berle 
and Means’ project.  He focused on the small degree of compensation 
that executives received through stock ownership and the potential of 
salaries to distort executive behavior.13  Others soon elaborated these 
points. 
In his 1940 text on the economics of the corporation, N. S. Bucha-
nan called “the corporation problem” the tendency of executives to grow 
“lax and inefficient” because they did not have an incentive to maximize 
profit.  Executives would seek “growth not profits,” he wrote, behavior 
                                                 
 10. R. A. Gordon, Financial Control of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29:1 AM. ECON. REV. SUPP. 
61, 85–99 (1939). 
 11. James Washington Bell, Dr. Scott, Gardiner C. Means & Paul M. O’Leary, Financial Con-
trol of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. SUPP. 109, 109–17 (1939).  There is a problem of 
evolving terminology here.  Gordon sees Means discussing something else, “power,” a point that is 
actually not inconsistent with what we see here as the thrust of Berle and Means’ actual argument.  
And in the article cited here, Means himself seems to accept a more relative concept of control, 
though it seems clear that the original intent of The Modern Corporation was to deal with control in 
more absolutist terms, with questions of relative power operative outside the narrower scope of 
control/management.  The important contrast to Gordon and those who follow, however, is that for 
Berle and Means, management was a function of control, not a third category. 
 12. As we shall see, Berle himself came around to roughly this position in his 1959 book, 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959). 
 13. Robert A. Gordon, Ownership and Compensation as Incentives to Corporation Executives, 
54 Q.J.  ECON. 455, 455–73 (1940). 
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that harmed both shareholders and consumers.14  However, Buchanan 
found little evidence of actual harm from the separation of management 
and ownership.15  By contrast, Gordon found mixed evidence that some 
executives actually had significant ownership stakes in their firms, and 
he recognized that non-pecuniary motivations might well offset the de-
cline of ownership in other cases.  But, either way, Buchanan, Gordon 
and others were shifting the emphasis from Berle and Means’ original 
notion of control to the somewhat different notion of management and 
managerial motivation. 
As the managerial perspective gained ascendancy, it spun off fur-
ther elaborations.  For some, the loss of property-ownership control 
could be a good thing, or at least not the problem that neo-classical econ-
omists imagined.  In perhaps the first use of the term, journalist and pop-
ular political theorist James Burnham explored this “managerial revolu-
tion” in his 1941 book of the same name.  In essence, Burnham argued 
“good riddance” to traditional ownership.  Property holding merely got 
in the way of long term growth and efficiency given the technical com-
plexity of modern production.  Eventually, Burnham predicted, managers 
would turn to the state to gain full control over corporate property, which 
he believed had already happened to a degree in Fascist Italy, New Deal 
America, and Communist Russia.16 
As novelist George Orwell pointed out, Burnham was positing that 
capitalism would yield not to socialism but to “a new kind of planned, 
centralized society, which will be neither capitalist nor democratic.”  It 
was a nightmare vision of Thorstein Veblen’s soviet of engineers, with 
the managers a new elite running industrial “super-states” that would vie 
for control of the earth.  The great mass of men and women, Berle and 
Means’ citizen-property owners, would be reduced to “semi-slaves at the 
bottom.”  Not surprisingly, Orwell used Burnham’s ideas as the basis of 
his dystopian novel, 1984.17 
The grim future Burnham predicted for managerialism, far beyond 
Berle and Means’ critique, made it important for liberals to distinguish 
managerialism in the United States from other ideologies.  Liberals were 
on board with some of Burnham’s notions, such as the need for planning, 
but they did not see the state as the end point of the managerial revolu-
tion.  A moderated managerialism soon emerged in the 1950s, as liberals 
argued that democratic societies could embrace the efficiency advantages 
                                                 
 14. NORMAN S. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 446–48 (1940). 
 15. Id. at 448. 
 16. JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE WORLD 
72, 88–89, 96, 133 (John Day Co. 1941). 
 17. George Orwell, Second Thoughts on James Burnham, POLEMIC, Summer 1946. 
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of the managerial revolution without succumbing to authoritarianism.18  
The mixed economy of postwar America helped to contain corporate 
power by boosting the power of other actors. 
Liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith explained how counter-
vailing powers held by labor, government, and consumers kept business 
in check while fostering technical efficiency in corporate management.  
Here was a pluralistic response that accepted the need for managerial 
expertise, but that answered fears that the modern corporation would 
yield either “the power of the few to manage the economic life of the 
nation,” or some form of statism, as Burnham predicted earlier.  Gal-
braith offered a third way, with “private economic power . . . held in 
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it.”19 
Galbraith’s ideas fit a postwar liberalism that emphasized the vir-
tues of professionals (in this case professional managers) as disinterested 
experts.  In this regard, the “hired” manager was superior to the property-
owning manager, as the editors of Fortune magazine noted, because “like 
all professional men he has a responsibility to society as a whole.”  This 
did not conflict with the manager’s primary job, to make money for the 
firm.  The manager’s “ability to make money is the prime measure of his 
company’s efficiency.”  But his power was held not by the divine right of 
property, a narrow and ultimately self-limiting justification.  The profes-
sional manager conducted business affairs in ways that were equitable 
and balanced among all stakeholders.20 
By the 1950s, even Adolf Berle made peace with the modern corpo-
ration and accepted the managerial thesis.  The further ownership and 
management separated, he wrote, the more the corporation would be-
come essentially a political entity in a liberal political economy.  His ear-
lier writings, Berle now stated, reflected the early stage of this process of 
separation, when control was merely plutocratic—in the hands of the 
insiders—and not yet fully democratic.21  But with growing use of inter-
nal financing and shares being held by insurance companies and pension 
funds, Berle foresaw “the increasing elimination of proprietary owner-
                                                 
 18. See Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of “Managerialism,”  31:1 J. BUS. 1, 1–11 (1958). 
 19. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING 
POWER 56–57, 111–13, 168–70, 200 (2d ed. 1956).  On the post-war decline of questions of power 
in economics more generally, see Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE 
RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 1930–1980, at 85–121 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 
1989) 
 20. RUSSELL W. DAVENPORT ET AL., U.S.A: THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION 68, 78–80 (1951). 
 21. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 61–69 (1959).  Modern notions of ownership do not give the 
shareholder the right to, as Berle vividly put it, walk off with the telephone poles just because one 
owns shares in a telephone company.  A possessory owner would have that right. 
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ship itself, and its replacement by, substantially, a power system.”22  As 
property lost its original, holistic meaning, power became plural, divided 
among managers, workers, boards of directors, and institutional share-
holders.  Berle celebrated this pluralism as a check on the plutocratic 
danger that arose when a small, self-selected group controlled every-
thing.23 
This positive interpretation of managerialism was shadowed by 
another, more negative one.  The negative interpretation could be traced 
back to Gordon’s seminal reading of The Modern Corporation, but it 
focused more on the microeconomic elements of organization and mana-
gerial motivations.  Herbert Simon and his followers in the 1950s ac-
cepted Gordon’s position that the motivation of the professional manager 
was the most significant issue of modern corporate capitalism. Simon 
took for granted that managers had control and that their interests were 
not linked in any significant way to the financial performance of the 
firm.24  As the managerial thesis narrowed to a micro-economy of indi-
vidual self-interest, economists wielding the tools of microeconomic 
analysis grew more engaged.  In 1959, American economist William 
Baumol, and later, in 1964, British economist Robin Marris, started with 
the position that professional managers ran large firms and that share-
holders and other financial interests had been successfully pushed to the 
background.25  According to Baumol and Marris, the perquisites of con-
trol were largely rendered as salary, staff, and discretionary investments.  
Managers sought to expand the size of their departments at the expense 
of profit maximization.26 
Some economists, such as Marris, engaged the larger social impli-
cations of the firm in the hands of professional managers.  Marris unders-
tood Berle and Means to be saying that managers were “disembodied 
entrepreneurs enjoying many of the fruits of capitalism without them-
                                                 
 22. Id. at 164. 
 23. Id. at 56–57.  Berle criticized pension fund managers for not becoming more active in the 
firms whose shares they held.  If they did, Berle believed, then the individual voices of the great 
majority of shareholders could find expression through the concentration of ownership in the 
pension or mutual fund.  Berle relied heavily on a rather vague notion of a public consensus that will 
prevent managers from straying too far.  Public consensus may have made sense at a moment when 
liberals believed the United States was a consensus society.  Id. at 107–19. 
 24. Certainly the behaviorists did not dismiss self-interest.  But the emphasis on other forms of 
motivation fit with an understanding of the firm as a complex organization of multiple interests 
where traditional, narrow definitions of owner self interest were no longer adequate. 
 25. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (New York 1959); 
ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (The Free Press 1964); 
Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 
1537, 1559 (1981). 
 26. See also RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 
239–52 (Prentice Hall, 1963). 
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selves providing much capital or taking proportionate risks.”  Yet, as he 
perceptively noted, “[t]here is nothing in the rules of traditional capital-
ism to require the owner-manager to exclude all forms of satisfaction 
other than money.”27  Thus, rather than departing from strict profit max-
imization, the professional manager might well be more focused on prof-
it and performance than the classic owner-manager, with his or her di-
verse menu of subjective motivations.  Indeed, as the fiduciary agents of 
others, managers had a greater obligation than did property owners to 
suppress their self-interest. 
Whereas liberals in the 1950s had argued that pluralism assured le-
gitimacy and social responsibility, economists were more skeptical.  
They looked for some self-disciplining system akin to the competitive 
market.  This was especially so among American economists.  As Marris 
noted, “[T]here can be little doubt that in the United States, somewhat in 
contrast to the other Western countries, the ideological yearning to legi-
timize the modern system by restoring classical-type motivation is po-
werful.”  Shareholder value in the United States soon became the “nor-
mative axiom” for construing managerial behavior.28 
In 1959, Yale law school dean Eugene Rostow threw down a neo-
conservative gauntlet to New Deal liberalism when he wrote that unless 
firms were responsible solely to their shareholders, the results would be 
“failed planning.”29  Gone were the non-pecuniary motives of the early 
administrative school or the countervailing powers of Galbraith.  Taking 
efficiency, as defined by neo-classical economics, as the point of the le-
gal system, a group of property rights theorists followed Rostow, arguing 
that there was only one best way to structure shareholder rights to 
achieve efficient outcomes.  The emphasis on property rights would coa-
lesce into a full blown intellectual movement as scholars, such as Frie-
drich Hayek and Milton Friedman, launched assaults on liberal notions 
of social responsibility.30 
                                                 
 27. MARRIS, supra note 25, at 10, 14. 
 28. Id. at 72. 
 29. Edward Mason, Apologetics of ‘Managerialism,’ in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 10 (E. Mason ed., Harvard Univ. Press, 1959). 
 30. Friedman stated in his famous article that the only social responsibility of managers was to 
increase profits for stockholders.  Interestingly, Friedman allows the possibility that stockholders as 
citizens might have social values and interests, but appears to hold that as stockholders they must 
only have an interest in firm profits.  Indeed, the article specifies the firm’s profits, not the well-
being of shareholders.  Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970.  In addition, Friedrich von Hayak’s classic attack on state 
planning appeared much earlier, in his 1944 The Road to Serfdom, but would be revived in the 1970s 
and 80s by anti-government conservatives.  F. A. HAYAK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Univ. of Chica-
go 1944). 
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Property rights theorists took inspiration from the writings of Brit-
ish-born economist Ronald Coase.  A few years after Berle and Means 
published their book, Coase wrote what at the time was a little noticed 
article on the nature of the firm.  He recognized that production in mod-
ern economies was coordinated by administrative means31 and the rea-
son, he concluded, had to do with the cost of transactions.  Where trans-
actions costs were high, firms arose.  Behind transactions costs, Coase 
argued, lay the costs of establishing relationships between different fac-
tors of production, mostly attributable to the difficulties of forming con-
tracts.32  Firms emerged as a set of ordered, legally-bound relationships 
between entrepreneurs and workers that were much easier to effectuate 
than multiple, arms-length contracts.  Gradually the contractual view 
would be applied to the relationship between owners, or the suppliers of 
capital, and managers.  Any deviation from this strict contractual rela-
tionship was soon seen as inefficient, or worse. 
It actually fell to legal scholars rather than economists to bring 
Coase’s insights to bear on the financial relationships of the modern cor-
poration.  A young law professor at St. Louis University with an under-
graduate background in economics, Henry Manne, focused on the poten-
tial for conflicts between the interests of shareholders and managers.33  
Ironically, Manne was attempting to refute what he took as the primary 
charges of The Modern Corporation: excessive managerial compensa-
tion, growing monopoly power, and frustration of shareholders’ demo-
cratic rights to vote their shares.  But his larger point was the need to ap-
ply modern economic theory to the legal and contractual issues that Berle 
and Means had first identified.  Manne excised any discussion of power, 
wealth, or their distribution that did not fit into the question of “the pro-
duction and allocation of scarce goods, services, and capital.”34 
Economists influenced by Coase soon filled out Manne’s agenda, 
starting with the position that the firm was a collection of more or less 
                                                 
 31. Since Coase took the firm to be directed by the owner-entrepreneur, he was not primarily 
interested in financial relations or even the role of managers. 
 32. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391–92, 401–04 (1937). 
 33. Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 
399, 399–400 (1962).  Eugene Rostow in To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management 
Responsible, in Mason, supra note 29, at 67, had written that, “The literature of ‘managerialism’ 
from Commons and Veblen to Drucker, Burnham, and Berle, suggests no criteria to replace the 
standards for judging the propriety of wages and prices which the economists have painfully devel-
oped during the last century or so.”  Id. 
 34. Manne, supra note 33, at 407, 430–31.  One might say that Manne emphasized those as-
pects of the book most amenable to modern economic analysis and reinterpreted the book’s intellec-
tual agenda in a like manner. 
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efficient contractual arrangements.35  Managers coordinated labor divi-
sions and monitored workers to ensure that they performed as directed.  
However, managers were also the agents of owners, and as such, needed 
watching.  The watchers were those who owned the firm, or at least those 
entitled to the firm’s residual income.36  Some economists argued that the 
contractual model could encompass a variety of stakeholders, including 
labor, consumers, and the public, each of whom might be seen as having 
an interest in the firm’s activities.  The narrower version tended to em-
phasize managers’ contractual obligations to shareholders only.37 
By the mid 1960s, the part of Berle and Means’ argument that fo-
cused on managerial behavior and motivation was the only one being 
discussed.  Those devoted to “law and economics” believed that markets 
structured efficient arrangements between contracting parties.  Managers 
were agents obligated to maximize shareholder value.  Principal-agent 
conflict was theoretically a problem, although many writers, following a 
long tradition dating back to Gordon, did not believe it was much of an 
issue in real life.  Others, however, were not so sure. 
In their seminal 1976 article, financial economists Michael Jensen 
and William Meckling noted that “[i]t should be no surprise to discover 
that the issues associated with the ‘separation of ownership and control’ 
in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated 
with the general problem of agency.”38  Berle and Means’ favorite term, 
“control,” now returned to the discussion, but only as what Michael Jen-
sen and Chicago School economist Eugene Fama called “decision con-
trol” or ratifying and monitoring the decisions of management.  The 
problem now was not the separation of ownership (and ancient notions of 
                                                 
 35. Manne and Rostow had started with the proposition that the firm was a social institution 
with social responsibilities. 
 36. The contractual position on the firm is perhaps made most clearly in Armen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 
777 (1972).  They placed emphasis on the manager’s role in monitoring and coordinating workers 
and on the owner’s role in policing the managers.  The logical corollary of this position, as Alchian 
and Demsetz spelled out, is that those who direct and manage labor, or more broadly firm inputs, 
should be paid as or as though he were a residual claimant.  Alternatively in large corporations, 
competitive markets for corporate control and for the shareholders capital might likewise keep man-
agers in line. 
 37. The shift is discussed well in ALLEN KAUFMAN, L. ZACHARIAS & M. KARSON, MANAGERS 
VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1995).  Manne discusses the connection between his work, the law, and the economics work of 
Demsetz, Alchian, and others in his essay, Henry G. Manne, How Law and Economics was Mar-
keted in a Hostile World: A Very Personal History, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 309–327 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005). 
 38. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  See also Eugene F. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). 
2010] Rethinking the Separation 1035 
property) from control, as termed by Berle and Means.  Rather, it was the 
“[s]eparation and specialization of decision management and residual 
risk bearing” that created a divergence of interests between agents and 
residual claimants, which led to “the problem of separation of ownership 
and control that has long troubled students of the corporation.”39 
Converging lines of inquiry had, by the 1970s, substantially rede-
fined concepts such as firm, ownership, property, and production, away 
from the perspective available at the time of Berle and Means’ original 
writing.  Now, production was reduced largely to a division of labor 
overseen by managers and the firm became a set of contracts with incen-
tives for performance.  Managers were the overseers of the work done by 
the firm’s division of labor and owners were those with a contractual 
right to residual income who monitored the managers.  A whole spate of 
issues connected to power, social responsibility, and democracy that had 
been central to Berle and Means faded away.40  The corporation problem 
was a technical matter of writing contracts, aligning interests, and giving 
residual claimants the authority they needed to keep the firm on the 
straight and narrow path of maximizing shareholder value. 
By 1980, Berle and Means’ book stood on its head.  The Modern 
Corporation sought to explain the rise of the managerial corporation and 
warn about its dangers.  Pro-management writers of the 1950s and 1960s 
found ways to justify the managerial corporation and celebrate its advan-
tages.  However, critics of managerialism, such as Michael Jensen, be-
lieved corporations should not exist at all in well-functioning market 
economies.  If firms simply “disgorged” their retained earnings to the 
owners, then the owners would make wiser investments than the profes-
sional managers.  In the late 1980s, Jensen wrote that the long estab-
lished public corporation was in eclipse because new institutions, without 
public shareholders, would be better able to “designate agents to manage 
and monitor on their behalf and bind those agents with large equity inter-
ests and contracts governing the distribution of cash.”41  America could 
finally return to the days when owners were active managers, the days 
                                                 
 39. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 301, 301–04, 308 (1983). 
 40. Ownership in any sense of possessing property disappeared, and entrepreneurship became 
simply management and risk bearing.  As Alchian and Demsetz explained in Production, Informa-
tion Costs, and Economic Organization: “Instead of thinking of shareholders as joint owners we can 
think of them as investors, like bondholders, except that the stockholders are more optimistic [i.e. 
less risk averse] than bondholders about the enterprise prospects.”  Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 
36, at 789. 
 41. Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 61–74 
(1989).  On Jensen’s view of the dire macroeconomic consequences of the behavior of corporate 
agents, see also Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of In-
ternal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993). 
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presumably before the phenomena identified by Berle and Means had 
arisen. 
But not everyone was prepared to go this far.  Indeed, business his-
torians studying the evolution of modern enterprise argued exactly the 
opposite of Jensen, that the modern corporation was a salutary develop-
ment.  Still, business historians built their defense on their own particular 
reading of Berle and Means’ text, a text they rarely cited.  In fact, in 
business historian Alfred Chandler’s two mammoth volumes, The Visible 
Hand and Scale and Scope, there is just one reference to Berle and 
Means, and that is in a list of economists who studied the firm.  Yet, 
Chandler and those who followed him took the managerial reading of 
Berle and Means’ work as central to their understanding of how the ma-
nagerial corporation arose and came to dominate many sectors of the 
economy by the 1920s.  This reading, quite like that of the agency theor-
ists, rested squarely on the notion that the modern corporation was de-
fined by the separation of owners from managers.  In The Visible Hand, 
Chandler wrote, “As the multiunit business enterprise grew in size and 
diversity and as its managers became more professional, the management 
of the enterprise became separated from its ownership.”42  Rather than 
seeing managers diverging from the interests of owners, Chandlerians 
argued that Berle and Means had identified the starting point of a more 
efficient and productive managerial capitalism.  Dispersed owners lacked 
the skills, knowledge, and patience to guide a modern firm.  Berle and 
Means were right about corporate structure and governance, business 
historians concluded, but wrong in failing to see the modern corporation 
as the most productive engine capitalism had ever known.43 
Both skeptical financial economists and pro-managerial business 
historians reduced Berle and Means’ complex book to one issue—the 
implications of professional managers running corporations of which 
they were not owners.  As we shall now see, that message is a stripped 
                                                 
 42. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 9 (Belknap Press 1977). 
 43. Id. at 5; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALISM 248–49 (Belknap Press 1990).  William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan also claim that 
for most of the 20th century stockholders exerted little control, and assume stockholders were dis-
persed.  William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Finance and Industrial Development: Part I: The 
United States and the United Kingdom, 4 FIN. HIST. REV. 7 (1997); William Lazonick, Financial 
Commitment and Economic Performance: Ownership and Control in the American Industrial Cor-
poration, 17 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 115 (1988).  A wide variety of works in business history continue 
to follow the assumption that ownership and control had separated and control was in the hands of 
managers earlier in the United States than elsewhere.  See, e.g., H. THOMAS JOHNSON & ROBERT 
KAPLAN, RELEVANCE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 94 (Harvard 
Business School Press 1987); Jeffrey Fear & Christopher Kobrak, Divergent Paths: Accounting for 
Corporate Governance in America and Germany, 80 BUS. HIST. REV. 1 (2006). 
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down version of what Berle and Means really wrote, which was about 
the separation of ownership from control.44   It was the control problem 
that motivated Berle, Means, and others who first studied the large scale 
corporation, and this control carried with it questions of social responsi-
bility. 
PEELING THE INTERPRETIVE ONION 
One less noted aspect in the intellectual legacy of The Modern Cor-
poration is how scant the evidence was for principal-agent problems.  
Studies found few examples of corporations resorting to internal finance 
to escape capital market discipline.45  Even as early as 1945, the business 
journal Fortune Magazine concluded, “It is clear that the idea of absentee 
ownership as usually interpreted is largely a fiction.”46  Perhaps this was 
because, as several close readers of The Modern Corporation discovered, 
little of the book actually addressed such conflict.  Chicago school lumi-
nary George Stigler was puzzled by the text’s “peculiar” emphasis on 
changing legal boundaries of permissible corporate behavior, and he crit-
icized Berle and Means for failing to address the “problems posed by the 
employment of agents” and “[t]he actual incentives and behavior of cor-
porate officials.”47  Stigler concluded, “The actual effects of the separa-
tion of ownership and control are left undetermined and even unstu-
died.”48 
It was not only critics from the right, such as Stigler, who had 
trouble with Berle and Means’ book.  Marxian economist Paul Sweezy 
                                                 
 44. It is clear from a reading of the original reviews that readers in the 1930s understood Berle 
and Means to be discussing the separation of ownership from control, and not providing a critique of 
the behavior of non-owner managers.  Stigler provided a table of quotations from contemporaries, 
lawyers in particular, who gave the book a strong favorable review.  Each of those reviewers com-
mented on how Berle and Means had demonstrated the dangers resulting from the divorce of owner-
ship from control, not management from ownership.  See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The 
Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237 (1983); Thomas K. 
McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 REVS. AM. HIST. 578 (1990). 
 45. John Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 
166–201 (Mason, ed., 1959). 
 46. ROBERT AARON GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 44 (Brook-
ings Institution 1945) (quoting Fortune Magazine). 
 47. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 44, at 240.  Manne commented that the “least satisfying 
part of Berle and Means’ book was the discussion of the return of profits to the shareholders by 
managers.  Manne, supra note 33, at 402. 
 48. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 44, at 238–39, 240.  For another skeptical view of the em-
pirical relationship between separation and poor performance, see Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, 
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985).  
The law and economics approach, which Stigler embraced in this article, assumed that markets 
would allow “contracting parties to minimize agency costs,” something that later agency theories 
were much less sure of.  See Douglass C. North, Comment on Stigler and Friedland: “The Literature 
of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means,” 26 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1983). 
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dismissed the notion that a new class of professional managers was now 
in charge of capitalism.49  Power still rested in the hands of property 
owners, he asserted.  Sociologist Maurice Zeitlin’s 1974 critique came to 
the same conclusion.  Like the old leftist Sweezy, the new leftist Zeitlin 
was skeptical of claims that professional managers, rather than a capital-
ist class, ran things in America. 
Critics from both the right and left drew from the same well of evi-
dence in their disagreement with Berle and Means.  The critics used a 
study conducted for the Temporary National Economic Committee by 
Raymond Goldsmith, which appeared at roughly the same time as Berle 
and Means’ book but came to rather different conclusions.50  Goldsmith 
found considerable ownership concentration and surprising resilience of 
family capitalism in the American corporate sector of the 1930s.  Only 
44% of firms fit Berle and Means’ own definition of managerial control, 
while some 32% were privately owned, controlled by a majority of 
shareholders, or controlled through such devices as pyramids and voting 
trusts.51  There were also evidentiary problems with claims that managers 
lacked proper motivation to maximize profits.  Sweezy may have been 
the first to point out that it was not the percentage of a firm’s stock held 
by managers that mattered, but it was the value of that stock in manag-
ers’ personal portfolios that determined their motivation.52  By this 
measure, a significant amount of executive wealth, if not annual compen-
sation, was held in the stock of the firms they managed.53 
More recent work tends to show that separation of ownership from 
control was neither as rapid nor as thorough as conventional readings of 
Berle and Means text assume.  Business historian Leslie Hannah demon-
strated that the dispersal of corporate shares in the United States was li-
mited compared to other nations in 1900.  Far from being at the forefront 
of modern corporate finance, the New York Stock Exchange lagged be-
hind its peers in Britain, France, and elsewhere.  Many of the largest 
American corporations did not list their shares in New York, and al-
                                                 
 49. Paul Sweezy, The Illusion of the ‘Managerial Revolution,’ 6 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 
(1942), reprinted in PAUL SWEEZY, THE PRESENT AS HISTORY 39–66 (Monthly Review Press 1953). 
 50. The TNEC study caused Robert Gordon to hedge his own interpretation, noting that there 
was still some evidence that managers had significant financial stakes in the firms they managed. 
 51. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 44, at 247. 
 52. Sweezy, supra note 49, at 45. 
 53. Gordon, in Business Leadership in the Large Corporation, notes that executive compensa-
tion averaged $35,000 in 1936, but that contrary to popular belief, “it is not correct to assume that 
executives have little or no ownership stake, in dollar terms, in their companies.”  GORDON, supra 
note 46, at 280.  Indeed, he finds that in 46 of 116 firms, executives held more than $1 million in 
their firms and median value holdings were nearly $300,000, or a substantial multiple of their annual 
compensation.  Id. at 299, 302.  At least to a quarter of industrial executives stock is “a very impor-
tant element among financial incentives available to them.”  Id. at 303. 
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though some used regional exchanges, even taken together, the United 
States stock markets listed fewer shares than did the markets of other 
industrial nations.54  Hannah’s work undercut claims that big American 
corporations were at the forefront of the financial innovations that would 
lead to a dispersal of ownership.  It was possible to have managerial ca-
pitalism and still have owners in control of big firms. 
One reason that owners could maintain substantial control in the 
United States, as historian Colleen Dunlavy points out, is that unlike in 
many European nations, American corporate law had moved decisively 
to “plutocratic” ownership.  That is, one share of stock entitled the owner 
to one vote in corporate governance; one thousand shares yielded one 
thousand votes, and so on without limit.  Elsewhere in the industrial 
world, corporate ownership was more democratic, meaning that above a 
certain level more shares did not increase one’s voting power, or at least 
did not increase it proportionally.  Therefore, American corporate law 
gave owners the ability to accumulate substantial power within the cor-
poration.55 
Thus, contrary to the progressive view offered by Alfred Chandler, 
whereby America leapt to the forefront of managerial capitalism, or the 
counter-argument declension thesis offered by Michael Jensen, in which 
America’s broad dispersal of stock gave managers too much discretion, 
through 1945 at least corporate ownership in America remained closely 
concentrated by late twentieth century standards, and families continued 
to exert substantial control. 
Let us take AT&T, Berle and Means’ favorite example.  As we 
have seen, the total number of stockholders increased substantially to 
some 450,000 in 1929, a dispersal that fits with Berle and Means’ argu-
ment.  There was just one problem: AT&T was the exception, not the 
rule among large American corporations.  Only one other American firm 
had 400,000 shareholders, the utility holding company Cities Services.  
After that the numbers fall fast.  Middle West Utilities had 296,389 
stockholders, the Pennsylvania Railroad 196,119.  Only ten corporations 
in all had more than 100,000 stockholders, and six of these were utilities 
or railroads, not the manufacturing firms usually seen as the progenitors 
of managerial capitalism. 
Of course, one hundred thousand shareholders is still substantial, 
but looking down the list of the 200 largest corporations in the United 
                                                 
 54. Leslie Hannah, The ‘Divorce’ of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-
calibrating Imagined Global Trends, 49 BUS. HIST. 404 (2007). 
 55. Colleen Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting 
Rights and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, 
POLITICS, CULTURE 66–93 (Kenneth Lipartito & David Sicilia eds., 2004). 
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States circa 1930, the number of shareholders drops off rapidly.  Among 
the top fifty firms ranked by assets, the average number of shareholders 
in 1930 was 65,000. (See Table 1.)  For industrial firms, it was substan-
tially lower at 41,000.  Ranking the 200 largest firms by number of 
shareholders rather than assets allows us to see that the median number 
of shareholders in large American firms was even smaller than the aver-
age.  Shareholder data is not available for all of the largest 200 firms, and 
some of the most significant American corporations, such as Ford, were 
family owned (more on that below).  But most of those on the list are in 
the top 100 corporations by assets, and even the smallest, General As-
phalt—with $46 million in assets—was the 250th largest firm in the 
United States.  The average firm by assets on this stockholder-ranked list 
is $445 million, which would place it 55 or 56 on the company size chart.  
Certainly, the list includes the larger corporations in the nation. 
Using the median figure reduces the weight of the small number of 
firms with a very large number of shareholders, yielding a more accurate 
picture of how many firms had a strong separation of ownership and con-
trol.  The median number of shareholders for the top 100 firms is 36,000, 
and for the industrials it is 30,000.  For all 74 industrials on the list, the 
median is 21,000, and for the entire list of 150 corporations, the median 
number drops to 19,000.  The firms with available shareholder numbers 
were substantially larger than those which were not, $445 million in as-
sets versus $117 million, suggesting that even these shareholder figures 
are the upper bound on dispersal in the United States.  Asset size alone, 
however, did not determine shareholder number as some large firms like 
the Reading Company and Erie Railroad had less than 10,000 sharehold-
ers.  In general, larger firms had more shareholders, as one would expect 
with the greater need for capital.  Even so, the numbers of shareholders 
they had were modest by modern comparisons or in comparison with the 
few exceptional cases, such as AT&T. 
Therefore, contrary to our image of widely dispersed ownership, 
most corporations, even fairly large ones, had only about one-tenth, or in 
many cases, one-twentieth the number of shareholders as AT&T did at 
the time of Berle and Means’ writing.  A few prominent industrials, such 
as General Motors, appear to have been well dispersed.56  A more refined 
                                                 
 56. GM, Ford, and DuPont had a small number of large owners who were members of the 
same family.  Family control was at quite the opposite end of the scale from highly dispersed public 
ownership of shares.  DuPont retained a strong family presence even though it innovated modern 
managerial practices, such as decentralization, practices thought to be closely connected to the sepa-
ration of ownership and control.  As economist Randall Morck noted, even today in many capitalist 
nations family control and pyramid structures remain common ways of concentrating ownership.  
Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon & Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance, Economic Entrench-
ment and Growth, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 655, 655 (2005). 
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portrait suggests that one block of corporations had between 10,000 and 
50,000 shareholders, and another group had less than 10,000 sharehold-
ers.57 
How significant are these numbers?  Some firms, not surprisingly 
AT&T and the Pennsylvania Railroad, had successfully ended any threat 
from large shareholders by placing their shares broadly among the pub-
lic.  Others, such as R. J. Reynolds and Deere, were clearly controlled by 
a small group of large shareholders.  And still other firms that we might 
think of being widely held, such as Standard Oil and DuPont, remained 
in the hands of an inside group.  As Table 2 shows, concentration was 
quite substantial, with a median level of ownership among the top 20 
shareholders of 18.5%.  In firms with less than 50,000 shareholders—the 
large majority of big corporations—the top 20 shareholders owned at 
least 10% of the stock, and upward of 50%, with the average at 25%.58 
                                                 
 57. Although more Americans owned stocks in the 1920s than ever before, Gardiner Means 
retorted that this did not indicate a shift in the ownership structure of the corporation, for lots of little 
stockholders possessed tiny fractions of stock that did little to shift control out of the hands of the 
few.  Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q. J. ECON. 561 
(1930). 
 58. These figures are consistent with those calculated from the same data by Robert Gordon, 
who largely interpreted them to mean a lack of concentration.  But Gordon also noted that the use of 
pyramids and holding companies concentrated ownership even more than these figures suggest.  As 
he put it succinctly, “large scale intercorporate ownership is not an indication of an association of 
‘control’ and ownership . . . .  It is rather a means of reducing the ownership needed for control by 
groups of individuals.”  GORDON, supra note 46, at 37. 
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A broader measure of concentration shows a similar pattern of con-
centration greater than one would expect if the separation of ownership 
from control had taken place by 1929.  If we take the 250 largest corpo-
rations (by assets) and examine shareholders owning more than 5,000 
shares, we see that even for firms widely held, a few dozen to a few hun-
dred people or institutions could control between 25–40% of the out-
standing common stock (see Table 3).  The average is 77 shareholders 
owning 42% of the common stock.59  Overall, 48% of American corpo-
rate stock was held by the 0.25% of shareholders who had more than 
5,000 shares.60 
At the very moment that Berle and Means were claiming the era of 
the stockholder had passed, 45% of the nation’s largest corporations had 
substantial ownership among their 20 largest shareholders.  In fact, if we 
are a bit more generous with our definition of ownership control and set 
it at 10% of common stock, then the 20 largest stockholders owned at 
least 10% of the stock in 78% of the nation’s largest companies in the 
early 1930s.61  Distribution of ownership varied rather substantially over 
                                                 
 59. Goldsmith’s study revealed that the top 20 shareholders controlled 50% of the stock in one 
quarter of the largest 200 corporations, and between 25–50% in another 20%.  RAYMOND W. 
GOLDSMITH, ET AL., THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST NON FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS, at Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 29 (1940).  It was 
this study that Stigler used to refute some of Berle and Means’ contentions. 
 60. Id. at 36. 
 61. Id. at 81.  Robert Gordon used the same data, but in the end still concluded that ownership 
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the largest corporations, so Berle and Means were not totally wrong by 
emphasizing wide dispersal of corporate stock.  In some, but very few 
cases (3 of 208 for which we have data), the single largest owner had less 
than 1% of the stock.  But, in a far higher number (32 of 208), the single 
largest owner had half or more.62  Looking backward from today when 
managerial control is more common, one could argue that the early dec-
ades of the twentieth century were an era of strong owner control, rather 
than the start of an era of dispersed ownership and weak owners.63 
Finally, a significant number of large American corporations re-
mained closely held, or even family enterprises, where control could be 
exercised by a small number of owners.  Family business and traditional 
close corporations were, in the literature emphasizing the rise of corpo-
rate capitalism, the legacies of the past that progressive American firms 
had abandoned.  As Goldsmith showed, a handful of families, notably the 
Du Ponts, Mellons, and Rockefellers, controlled among them 15 of the 
largest 200 corporations.64  Other, less famous families had substantial 
minority holdings in a number of significant firms.65  Family members 
who owned as little as 5% of a company’s stock remained heavily 
represented on the boards of firms.66  Goldsmith reckoned that in 40% of 
the largest 200 firms a family or small number of families had either ab-
                                                                                                             
found that the largest 20 shareholders took 23% of the stock issued.  GORDON, supra note 46, at 32–
33. 
 62. Id. at 91.  Like Berle and Means, Goldsmith was uncertain when control passed from own-
ers to managers, though he set a reasonable figure of at least 30% ownership, and in some cases as 
little as 10% ownership as giving an owner significant power.  It depended, of course, on how many 
owners had significant minority stakes like this. 
 63. The Modern Corporation and Private Property rests on the proposition that if 40% of a 
firm’s stock was closely held, then it was owner controlled, although sometimes Berle and Means 
lowered this percentage to 20% if a small number of shareholders were involved.  But as Zeitlin 
pointed out, Berle and Means “merely assumed, rather than demonstrated, that once a cohesive own-
ership interest having at least a minimum specified portion of the stock disappears,” then the corpo-
ration “slips imperceptibly and inevitably under ‘management control.’” Maurice Zeitlin, Corporate 
Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. SOC. 1073, 
1090 (1974).  For a related critique see Stigler & Friedland, supra note 44, at 247. 
 64. The DuPont’s owned 38.5% of DuPont, 20% of General Motors, and 11.5% of U.S. Rub-
ber.  The Mellons owned 29% of Aluminum Company of America, 42% of Koppers, 70% of Gulf 
Oil, and 10% of Pullman.  GOLDSMITH, ET AL., supra note 59. 
 65. Id. at 117–19, 124.  The Harkness family had 2.13% of the stock of Socony Vacuum Oil, 
3.44% of Standard Oil of California, 2.92% of Standard of Indiana, and 4.3% of Standard of New 
Jersey (but only 0.19% of AT&T).  Id. 
 66. Id. at 113.  A popular version of this was put forth in a book by Ferdinand Lundberg pub-
lished soon after The Modern Corporation, which argued that a handful of families really ran the 
large corporations.  Though overstated, Lundberg’s thesis fit well with the Goldsmith study and the 
anti-monopoly tradition that was part of the New Deal era.  See FERDINAND LUNDBERG, AMERICA’S 
SIXTY FAMILIES (Vanguard Press 1937). 
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solute or effective working control, and in another 30% of firms, control 
was exercised by another corporation.67 
Were Berle and Means then simply alarmist in their charges against 
the modern corporation?  No.  The figures only call into question the 
claim that stock dispersal was key to placing power in the hands of non-
owners.  The figures also highlight the difference between ownership and 
management and ownership and control.  Large corporations could be 
managed by professionals who owned little or no stock, even when the 
corporate stock was closely held.  But Berle and Means’ main focus was 
not management but control, a concept pushed to the margins by later 
writers.  Therefore, the evidence on the limited extent of dispersal and 
the high degree of concentration only undercuts the later readings of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property that highlighted stock disper-
sal and the professional managers’ rise as agents of shareholders. 
The data supports the aspects of Berle and Means’ text that have 
largely been ignored by financial economists and later interpreters.  The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property argued that control of a cor-
poration could be achieved in a variety of ways, without necessarily dis-
tributing the corporate stock widely among the public.  At one extreme, 
families could retain control of firms, even while gaining access to capi-
tal markets for growth and installing professionals to manage the firm.  
At the other end were corporations, such as AT&T, with wide public 
ownership of stock.  Most large corporations fell between these poles.  
Dispersed stockholding was merely a special case of a more general 
problem of control and the modern corporation.68 
                                                 
 67. GOLDSMITH, ET AL., supra note 59, at 36.  As recent scholarship on family ownership ar-
gues, “What is crucial is the extent to which a family is able to mold company decisions through 
personal influence on leadership succession, sometimes unfettered by any formal institutional regu-
lation of governance.”  Andrea Colli, Paloma Fernandez Perez & Mary B. Rose, National Determi-
nants of Family Firm Development? Family Firms in Britain, Spain, and Italy in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, 4 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 28–64, 31 (2003); JEFFREY FEAR, ORGANIZING 
CONTROL: AUGUST THYSSEN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 25 
(2005), notes that Chandler in The Visible Hand privileged the “site” of control—family, entrepre-
neur, manager.  Chandler did not investigate how control is exercised, how decisions are actually 
made. 
 68. One could still argue that in those cases where a few hundred shareholders owned no more 
than 15% or 20% of a firm’s stock, owners were indeed weak and managers ran the show.  But con-
sider that Clarence Mackay pressed his claim for greater control with only 5% of AT&T’s outstand-
ing stock.  True, AT&T fended him off, but it already had one of the most dispersed patterns of stock 
ownership, and it would move to still higher levels of dispersal following the Mackay incident.  
Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, in Corporate Governance, point out that typically literature finds that 
much less than 50% ownership is needed to effect control.  Supra note 56, at 6.  Indeed 20% or even 
10% is sufficient, and the majority of corporations in many countries have owners with 10–20% 
stakes, even in advanced industrial nations.  The average seems to be about 36% of firms worldwide 
can be considered widely held, with the percentages much higher in the U.S. and U.K. 
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BACK TO CONTROL, AND THE TEXT 
Instead of projecting forward and seeing Berle and Means as antic-
ipating the future of corporate finance, let us look back to the times in 
which they wrote.  Even before their work appeared, others had com-
mented on the growth of corporations and the fading of individual own-
ers.  One of the most important predecessor works, as Berle and Means 
acknowledged, was William Z. Ripley’s widely read 1928 exposé, Main 
Street and Wall Street.  Ripley began with corporate governance rather 
than ownership, but by governance Ripley meant something different 
from what it means today.  He looked to the great legal commentator 
Blackstone, who wrote that the corporation was best seen as a “little re-
public.”69  Berle, in his 1920s legal writings, took a similar position.  
Like Ripley, Berle saw corporations as voluntary associations with mu-
tual obligations, rights, and duties between members and the communi-
ty.70  New financial devices, such as non-voting stock, trusteeships, and 
most of all, no par value stock, disrupted these mutual obligations and 
interests and fostered inequality in the republic of the corporation.  Rip-
ley and Berle emphasized a variety of financial and legal devices that 
contributed to this inequality, and wide dispersal of shares was one 
among several.71 
No par stock came in for a special drubbing by Ripley and Berle.  
When the law required stock to carry a par value, it contemplated inves-
tors as equals, contributing their capital to the collective enterprise they 
would own and operate as a group (the “little republic”).  The move to no 
par issues, though seemingly just a minor technical matter, actually indi-
cated a substantial shift in the conception of the corporation.  Now 
“owners” were not capitalists risking their capital, but simply, as Ripley 
put it, claimants to “a certain aliquot part of the net value of the enter-
prise.”72  There was no longer a presumption that governance and control 
went hand-in-hand with property ownership.  Berle railed at length at no-
par stock.  If the corporation could issue shares for no paid-in cash, then 
                                                 
 69. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 74 (1926).  Ripley and Berle were 
part of a generation of American social and economic thinkers who had rejected the strictures of 
nineteenth century laissez faire economics and took a social rather than individualistic view of prop-
erty.  See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 100 
(1998). 
 70. Berle had a weakness for seeing a more organic society in the past.  As Isaiah Berlin ob-
served, he had “a nostalgia for preindustrial civilization and the Middle Ages . . . .”  JORDAN A. 
SCHWARTZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 180 (1987). 
 71. RIPLEY, supra note 69, at 76–77, 85, 121. 
 72. Id. at 46.  The use of the legal term “aliquot” was itself telling, for it means a definite frac-
tion of the estate of a deceased.  The sense of definite portion, rather than speculative profit and the 
link to the dividing up of a static estate are both meant to suggest the passive role of the shareholder 
with respect to firm income earning potential. 
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it had virtually limitless power to alter the capital structure in ways that 
rewarded some owners at the expense of others.73 
Here was the crux of the matter, for it was not so much the efficien-
cy implications as the social issues that bothered Berle and Ripley.  Let-
ting the financially clever manipulate the corporate structure in their fa-
vor undermined the moral basis of capitalism.  New financial structures, 
Ripley argued, led to “the growing dissociation of ownership of property 
from responsibility for the manner in which it shall be put to use.”74  Fol-
lowing Louis Brandeis, he held that there was “no innocent sharehold-
er.”75  Shareholders as owners should take a responsibility for their prop-
erty in a manner similar to that expected of owners of any business.  All 
property owners had obligations to refrain from harming others and for 
acting in a manner consistent with social, moral, and community values.  
Once shareholders were rendered passive, however, they were discon-
nected from these obligations.  With their property managed by others 
hidden behind the corporate veil, all sorts of evil could be worked with-
out shareholder knowledge or consent.76  The corporation ceased to be a 
morally accountable entity. 
Lack of transparency and information were part of the problem, and 
both Ripley and Berle endorsed Brandeis’s injunction that sunshine was 
the best disinfectant.77  But good information did more than give share-
holders the means to pursue their pecuniary interests—it let shareholders 
see what corporations were doing in their names.  Brandeis, Berle, and 
Ripley assumed that informed shareholders would not simply demand a 
bigger piece of the pie; they would demand moral accountability and eth-
ical behavior of “their” property, once it was theirs again.  It was precise-
ly this connection between moral accountability and property that the 
modern corporation severed.  If it could not be restored, these progres-
sive thinkers feared that unchecked power would inevitably spill over 
into the political system.  Just as the little republic of the corporate asso-
ciation had been corrupted by powerful insiders, so too would the big 
republic be imperiled by the wealthy and powerful few—no par stock 
given away for political favors or whatever else the insiders deemed to 
be in their interest. 
                                                 
 73. ADOLF BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 64–91 (Callaghan & Co. 
1928).  There is a tendency here to disregard the secondary market for shares, which would tend to 
mitigate the diluting effects of new shares issued. 
 74. RIPLEY, supra note 69, at 116. 
 75. Id. at 79. 
 76. Id. at 67–68.  Berle backed Ripley and Wilson on this point.  BERLE, supra note 73, at 46–
50, 179, 182–83. 
 77. The latter chapters of The Modern Corporation discuss the value of disclosure and equal 
access to information in some detail. 
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Power was all of a piece for thinkers like Berle, Brandeis, and Rip-
ley.  They saw intimate connections between the corporation’s financial 
power to exploit the passive shareholder, its monopoly power to exploit 
the consumer, and its political power to corrupt government.  Where a 
contemporary economist would compartmentalize these issues, dividing 
principal-agent conflicts from monopoly and monopsony power, Berle 
and Means followed the tradition of treating power as unitary and 
lumped them together.  All were manifestations of the same danger—a 
new class of corporate potentates wielding power that had not been ren-
dered legitimate by the rights of property.78 
The Modern Corporation is best seen as part of a tradition stret-
ching back to the progressive and populist critiques of the growing con-
centration of wealth and power in America.  Indeed, wealth, power, and 
corporate social irresponsibility were the issues highlighted in most early 
reviews of Berle and Means’ book.79  The problem was not just who 
claimed the firms’ residual earnings, but who made fundamental deci-
sions about production and distribution,a handful of corporate insiders or 
the broad class of citizens? 
Berle and Means’ understanding of the dangers of unchecked cor-
porate power led them to focus on the concept of control, the fundamen-
tal power from which the other powers flowed.  Owners had an interest 
in the firm and managers made decisions, but the “control” had final au-
thority, particularly the authority to select (or act as) managers.  Control 
served better than power to explain what happened inside the corpora-
tion.  Power was scalar and relative.  Control was final.  It was the abso-
luteness of control that was the root problem, even if control was 
achieved with but a slight balance of power.  “Control,” explained Means 
in another work, “should commonly be applied only to the major powers 
over an enterprise, just as ownership and management are usually ap-
plied only to the major interests and acts.”80  Not surprisingly then, in 
some cases, “managers” still owned substantial stakes in the firm, while 
in other cases they did not.  Management was an artifact of control, how-
ever control was achieved.81  It made little difference whether one gained 
                                                 
 78. Given that the guiding intellectual spirit of the project, Adolf Berle, was a lawyer, this 
emphasis on legal legitimacy and property is not surprising.  In a deft reading of Berle and Means, 
McCraw notes the centrality of power, though he incorrectly states that it was only monopoly power 
that they were worried about.  McCraw, supra note 44, at 582–84. 
 79. McCraw, supra note 44, at 579. 
 80. Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 46:1 
Q.J. ECON. 68, 70 (1931). 
 81. Id. at 68–100. 
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control through majority ownership, minority ownership, by a clever le-
gal strategy, or simply by holding a management position.82 
Following this way of thinking about how control was achieved, 
then “managerial discretion” was not necessarily a problem and forms of 
compensation mattered little.  Indeed, Berle had written earlier that man-
agers should “have wide discretion in conducting the business affairs of 
the corporation.”83  In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Berle and Means endorsed independent managerial judgment as well.  
“No better principle in carrying out business,” they wrote, “has yet been 
worked out than to find able men and give them the completest latitude 
possible in handling the enterprise.”84  To the extent that professionals 
brought expertise (what Berle called “technical powers”) to bear on cor-
porate matters, economists Frank Taussig and W. S. Baker noted that in 
America the long-followed principle was that the rewards of manage-
ment were wages, while profits rightly belonged to the owners.85  In Eu-
rope, by contrast, compensation was commonly linked to earnings, the 
tantieme system popular in France and elsewhere.86  It was in fact Berle 
and Means’ insight to recognize that trouble began precisely when man-
agement, or more precisely the control group, used its position to en-
hance its rewards.  The control group could take extra profit at the ex-
pense of other shareholders, exploit insider knowledge, and make swee-
theart deals.  Compensation beyond a salary for professional expertise 
was the first sign that something had gone wrong in a corporation and 
was not a method for linking managers’ interests to those of owners. 
The conflict that Berle and Means emphasized was not between 
managers and owners, but between owners and owners.  In one corner 
were the significant minority shareholders (the tiny percentage owning 
over 5,000 shares); in the other, the prototypical small shareholder.87  It 
                                                 
 82. Id. at 72. 
 83. BERLE, supra note 73, at v-vi.  For more on Berle’s distinction between this dangerous 
property rights power and his acceptance of managerial discretion over policy and technical matters, 
see BERLE, supra note 74, at 29 
 84. A. A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, Corporations and the Public Investor, 20 AM. ECON. 
REV. 60 (1930). 
 85. On Berle’s use of term “technical powers” of management, see BERLE, supra note 73, at 
28–29. 
 86. F. W. Taussig & W. S. Barker, American Corporations and Their Executives: A Statistical 
Inquiry, 40 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1925).  Taussig and Barker also found executive ownership decline was 
not directly related to firm size, and that there were plenty of cases where managers were substantial 
owners.  They noted that “the functions of ownership and management are combined in all sorts of 
ways, and may not be combined at all.”  Id. at 18.  They also noted that in more than half their cases, 
executives were related or closely connected to others who owned stock in their firms. 
 87. McCraw points out that control can take many forms, including large shareholders.  
McCraw, supra note 44, at 585–86.  He points out correctly that “Berle and Means saw the problem 
more as an injustice wrought by one group of stockholders against another.”  Id. 
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was not the large shareholder who was excluded from management, only 
the small shareholder.88  As Berle observed in his earlier writings, “con-
trol of American corporations by holders of a minority of the capital 
stock is no novelty to business men or lawyers.”89  “A compact minori-
ty,” he wrote, “will settle both the personnel and the policy of manage-
ment.”90  Even more significant, though, was the control group’s “power 
over private property.”91  Although “technical power” over management 
decisions was fine as far as Berle was concerned, the control group 
“sought and secured a new type of power . . . to determine and adjudi-
cate property rights between the participants in the corporate entity.”92  
The problem came when “management” not only had business judgment 
but “power to determine which of the various groups in a corporation 
shall receive the income . . . .”  It was not the failure to reward owners 
adequately that Berle and Means were denouncing, but the distribution of 
rewards, or the shifting of “the profits of the enterprise and . . . the under-
lying assets . . . from one group of stockholders to another.”93  Control 
allowed the insider group to transfer wealth into its hands, regardless of 
who owned the corporation.94 
This emphasis on control and property (or control over property) 
helps to explain why very little of Berle and Means’ book speaks about 
principal-agent conflict.  The principal-agent issue appears only in some 
of the early pages, specifically on page four: “The direction of industry 
by persons other than those who have ventured their wealth has raised 
the question of the motive force back of such direction and the effective 
distribution of the returns from business enterprise.”95  The words sug-
gest that lack of proper financial motivation might be a problem, though 
exactly what problem is unclear.  Over the next few pages, Berle and 
                                                 
 88. See Zeitlin, supra note 66, at 1083; LUNDBERG, supra note 66. 
 89. BERLE, supra note 73, at 41–42. 
 90. Id. at 190.  Here, too, Berle admitted that this insider power could be wielded by an “en-
trenched management” or by bankers, but these were merely variants on the theme. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at v-vi.  For more on Berle’s distinction between this dangerous property rights power 
and his acceptance of managerial discretion over policy and technical matters, see id. at 29. 
 93. Berle, Jr. & Means, supra note 84, at 65, 71.  Because there are so many stockholders and 
others involved in the modern, large scale corporation, the problem of “intra-corporate rights” 
loomed large.  BERLE, supra note 73, at 2. 
 94. This transfer of wealth had happened, Berle believed, as corporate charters became broad 
and general.  Before the powers, rights and duties of each member of the capital structure had been 
clearly spelled out.  In freeing managers to make business decisions, the states had freed managers of 
the old set of fiduciary duties to other stockholders.  This fit Berle’s point about the decline of pri-
vate property in its old form. 
 95. Stigler was again puzzled when he noted that “The problems posed by the employment of 
agents are . . . ignored,” an observation that would appear to question the usefulness of Berle and 
Means for later agency theorists.  Stigler & Friedland, supra note 44, at 240. 
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Means note that the loss of owner control will lead to inefficiency and 
underperformance.  But what about the other 380 pages of text?  A 
statement on the efficiency and behavioral implications of ownership-
management separation never appears again.  Leaving aside the statistic-
al presentation, the remainder of the book takes up the issues of control, 
power, and their social consequences in the corporate age. 
Though this seemed strange to later economists such as Stigler, it 
should now be clear that control and social responsibility were the most 
important economic issues of Berle and Means’ times.96  Their lengthy 
disquisition on corporate law reflected an unease with American legal 
traditions that gave minority stockholders so little voice.  It did not mat-
ter, however, if minority owners were being exploited by propertyless 
managers or by other, somewhat larger “minority” owners.  As Berle and 
Means explained, “The device used for ‘control’ seems to be immateri-
al—whether it be voting trust, domination by a stockholder, or possibly 
even domination by a creditor.”97  New classes of non-voting stock, no 
par value stock, and preference shares were all mechanisms for transfer-
ring wealth and power to the control group, and they were, astonishingly, 
perfectly legal.  Indeed, the control group could go so far as to take rights 
from one group of shareholders and give them to others.98 
Actions by the control group that might look questionable today of-
ten passed muster with the courts before the creation of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission in 1934.  “There is . . . a range of neutral ac-
tivity in which the management of the corporation, without acting ad-
versely to the corporation, may nevertheless benefit itself,” Berle and 
Means noted.99  Insider trading that did not reduce the overall value of 
the firm, favors tendered to selected owners, and corporate cash held in 
the banks of friends were perfectly legal.  Indeed, if the book had little to 
say about poor managerial decisions reducing shareholder value, it had 
much to say on value-neutral actions that impoverished one subgroup of 
owners and enriched another.100 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 239–41. 
 97. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 239–40 (1933).  All references to this text are from the first edition. 
 98. Id. at 213–19.  Means also discusses control by minority shareholders, though Means notes 
that it becomes generally impossible when no shareholder owns more than one or two percent.  
Means, supra note 80, at 84.  But it is quite possible when that number rises to 14 or 20%.  Id. 
 99. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 97, at 231. 
 100. Berle and Means went to considerable length to establish the pervasiveness and dangers of 
control, but in some of their most telling examples, it was control by a group of shareholders, not by 
a cadre of propertyless managers.  When, for example, William Fox wanted to acquire Loews Thea-
tre, he paid a high price for the shares of a small group of dominant stockholders, simply because 
that group exercised control.  Id. at 243–44. 
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 In addition, aggrieved owners who lacked control were largely 
powerless to stop these redistributions.  Sometimes, in fact, pursuit of a 
remedy was worse than the original grievance: “hazardous in the ex-
treme,” wrote Berle and Means.  Their most striking example was the 
takeover of the New York and Northern Railroad by the New York Cen-
tral Railroad.  Minority shareholders in the acquired railroad complained 
that Central was diverting traffic onto its own tracks, siphoning off sub-
stantial revenue.  In response, the New York Central simply allowed the 
bonds of the New York and Northern Railroad to go into default.  The 
subsequent receivership wiped out the common stock of the New York 
and Northern, the shareholders’ case, and their property.101  The court’s 
position, Berle and Means lamented, was that “the interests of the indi-
vidual may be sacrificed to the economic exigencies of the enterprise as a 
whole, the interpretation of the board of directors as to what constitutes 
an economic exigency being practically final.”102 
Such unchecked power could be wielded by managers in the stan-
dard principal-agent manner, but the data on ownership presented above 
and Berle and Means’ own examples suggest that more often it was a 
case involving a small group of privileged inside owners running rough-
shod over smaller and less powerful owners.  Berle and Means most of-
ten described control as the power to exploit others: the “controlling 
group” will have “free rein, with the corresponding danger of a corporate 
oligarchy coupled with the probability of an era of corporate plunder-
ing.”103  The image they painted was not of managers swilling martinis at 
lunch while shareholder value plummeted, but rather lambs being 
sheared. 
Recent scholarship has tended to confirm the problems of minority 
owners in American corporations.  Economic historians Naomi Lamo-
reaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal find the “plight” of minority share-
holders a grim one in America before World War II, explaining that the 
courts let the controlling shareholders act as “dictators.”104  Meanwhile, 
“minority shareholders only had limited ability to protect themselves 
                                                 
 101. Id. at 240. 
 102. Id. at 277–78. 
 103. Id. at 355. 
 104. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of 
Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, at 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10,900, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10900. 
Writing of an earlier period, Eric Hilt notes, “‘minority control,’ where firms were operated by man-
agers holding stakes that were large enough to make them unaccountable to the other shareholders, 
was quite common.”  Powerful owners, Hilt writes, held sweeping powers to use corporate resources 
for their own benefit, which is exactly what Berle and Means saw a century later.  Eric Hilt, When 
Did Ownership Separate from Control?  Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 
J. ECON. HIST. 679 (2008). 
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against abuse,” hemmed in by reluctant courts, a strong “business deci-
sion” doctrine, and the one vote per share rules that allowed those with 
even a small concentration of shares to swing elections in their favor.105 
The problem of insider power was not just minority versus majority 
owners, but rather that a substantial minority clique could obtain control 
and realize all the benefits of majoritarian power so long as the remain-
ing shareholders were small, weak, and disorganized.  Any coalition in a 
position to appoint the directors also effectively possessed unchecked 
power.  As the great legal scholar James Willard Hurst wrote, in the 
twentieth century power within the corporation shifted to the “active in-
siders.”  Hurst observed that the same conditions of dispersed ownership 
that Berle and Means thought signaled the rise of a propertyless mana-
gerial class could also give power and control to active minority insid-
ers.106  This is why Berle and Means could use the same data to show 
dispersal of ownership that Goldsmith would use to show concentration; 
both were true.  A small number of large, although still technically mi-
nority, holders wielded disproportionate power, while most shareholders 
held only a few shares and remained inactive, with little hope of chal-
lenging the control group. 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In addressing issues of control, power, and distribution inside the 
modern corporation, Berle and Means examined the social as well as the 
economic implications of corporate capitalism.107  Strengthening share-
holder rights would not simply allow shareholders to make more money, 
it would assure that no insider used the corporation to serve his or her 
own narrow ends.  The objective was to prevent plutocrats from control-
ling the key economic institution of modern capitalism. 
Corporate plutocracy was especially worrisome before the New 
Deal, when it seemed that “the power of corporate management is be-
coming practically absolute, while social controls upon [it] remain al-
most embryonic.”108  Although Berle relented quite a bit on this position 
after World War II, it was only because he believed that property had 
                                                 
 105. Id.  The protections for those not in control were so weak that American entrepreneurs 
were motivated to form partnerships, despite extremely liberal incorporation laws.  The one effective 
check on directors’ power came when the corporation took action that went beyond its charter, or in 
legal terminology, ultra vires.  Yet as Berle and Means noted, even this limitation was easily over-
come. 
 106. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970 70 (1970). 
 107. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 99, at 352.  See also Berle & Means, supra note 85, at 54–
71. 
 108. BERLE, supra note 73, at 25–27. 
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evolved and that the corporation had indeed become a social institution, 
checked by a much stronger state.109  By contrast, the current econo-
mists’ view turns shareholders into little more than managers of their 
own portfolio of assets, a far cry from Berle’s notion that property car-
ried deep social rights and responsibilities.  Whereas modern economists 
treat corporate social responsibility as a problem, Berle and Means saw it 
as the solution. 
The Modern Corporation ends with a question: should the corpora-
tion be made to serve society in the broader sense?  The question reflect-
ed a lively debate, which had taken place on the pages of the Harvard 
Law Review just before the book’s publication.  In a 1931 article, Berle 
attempted to specify rules of equity that would force the corporate con-
trol group to act in the interests of all shareholders.  Berle’s model was 
the fiduciary trust, and the control group should be constrained by law to 
act as trustees for the interests of all shareholders.  It was just the sort of 
compromise Berle liked, keeping the corporation private, allowing man-
agers wide latitude on technical matters, but yet protecting classes of 
stockholders weakly positioned in the corporate structure.110 
In a reply to Berle that appeared in the law review the next year, le-
gal scholar E. Merrick Dodd concluded that corporations held so much 
power over labor and consumers as to be by their mere existence broadly 
affected with a public interest.111  Dodd shifted the emphasis to managers 
and agents, and away from internal corporate power struggles.  He inter-
preted the problem as “giving stockholders much-needed protection 
against self-seeking managers . . . .”  In contrast to later agency theory, 
however, Dodd assumed that such a narrow definition of corporate pur-
pose could never do because large firms, indeed in some industries even 
small traditional firms, were simply too caught up with public purposes 
and interests to be reduced to vehicles for shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion.  Instead, Dodd proposed that “the law is approaching the point of 
view which will regard all business as affected with a public interest.”112  
The fiction that corporations were mere private, profit seeking bodies of 
shareholders should be abandoned in favor of a view that corporations 
                                                 
 109. Berle was still bothered by its legitimacy, now that the ownership basis of legitimacy had 
atrophied.  Yet, his hopes for pension funds reflect his efforts to find a property basis for legitimacy. 
 110. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).  
Even a quick reading shows that Berle was not focused on managers and did not identify the inter-
ests of “shareholders” in the abstract, but rather different subgroups and power blocks among share-
holders.  The phrase “all the shareholders” is telling.  It clearly does not mean all in the undifferen-
tiated or collective sense, but all the component parts of a collection.  As Berle also points out, his 
principal would in some ways allow managers even greater autonomy. 
 111. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145 (1932).  See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 43–45. 
 112. Dodd, supra note 111, at 1149. 
1054 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
were real institutions serving a diverse lineup of what today might be 
called stakeholders.  The corporation, Dodd wrote, “once it becomes a 
going concern, takes its place in a business world with certain ethical 
standards which appear to be developing in the direction of increased 
social responsibility.”113 
Despite the debate with Dodd, Berle did not disagree that the corpo-
ration, as he put it, “exists to serve life, not to determine it.”114  But Berle 
clung to the shareholder, fearing that otherwise there would be no prin-
ciple for legitimizing the power of the controlling group.  If those in 
charge understood at least a fiduciary duty to shareholders, then the re-
public of shareholders would be able to insist on both equitable and ethi-
cal behavior from their corporations.  It was a bit of a stretch, but Berle 
was certain his position fit the longer history of the rights, duties, and 
obligations of private property.  Once the interests of all stockholders 
were equally and fairly protected, the dispersal of ownership could be-
come a force for social good, as the shareholder group became, in effect, 
the community.  Private property could co-exist with social responsibili-
ty, as long as the concentrations of corporate power were broken up.  
This coexistence required some active intervention from government, 
which is why Berle joined the New Deal and helped to structure the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission in 1934.115 
In Berle and Means’ time, the debate over control and corporate 
structure was never confined to the narrow sense of self interest used by 
economists today.  Indeed, both Berle and Dodd agreed on this point—
giving shareholders more rights and greater power would broaden their 
interests.  It was the narrow self interest of corporate insiders that was the 
problem, after all.  Berle’s hope was not to return to the older definition 
of private property or to reinstitute the traditional close corporations but 
to “broaden wealth to expand the shareholding class,” which would make 
for a more ethical corporation.116 
                                                 
 113. Dodd, supra note 111, at 1161. 
 114. BERLE, supra note 12, at 118.  A nearly identical statement appears in Ripley’s, Main 
Street and Wall Street.  RIPLEY, supra note 69, at 8.  It was a difficult position intellectually for 
Berle, for those who emphasized the underlying individuals in the corporation, such as business 
lawyer Victor Morowetz, did so for conservative purposes that limited the corporation’s social re-
sponsibilities.  See BERLE, supra note 73, at 2–8. 
 115. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365 (1932).  Berle’s fear with Dodd’s stakeholder scheme was a repeat of what the battle for con-
trol had already loosened inside the corporation—group after group trying to get the most they could 
for themselves. 
 116. SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 65. 
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MACKAY AND AT&T ONCE AGAIN 
With this context we can now understand the Clarence Mackay and 
AT&T story.  Before managers could be seen as the agents of passive 
investors, stock ownership not only had to become dispersed but con-
flicts of power within the corporation had to be resolved in ways that 
permitted managers to act independently of powerful coalitions and fac-
tions.  This is precisely what was going on in the AT&T-Mackay con-
flict, a progenitor of things to come. 
Clarence Mackay’s request for a place on the corporate board was 
part of an on-going internal struggle for control among the active insid-
ers, and existing AT&T board members understood his request in just 
this way.  Investment banker T. Jefferson Coolidge put it bluntly: “The 
Mackay Co.’s have nerve.  Their interests are opposed to ours and of 
course . . . cannot secure representation.”117  Coolidge had just helped 
AT&T end a significant threat from a competing telephone firm, the Erie 
Company, in a complicated bit of strategic maneuvering involving 
Mackay.  The Erie Company had marketed its securities through Coo-
lidge’s Old Colony Trust Company.  When the Erie Company collapsed, 
AT&T scooped up its stock at a bargain price with Coolidge’s help.  
Mackay, meanwhile, was seeking to connect AT&T to his own Postal 
Telegraph Company (Postal).  Postal was a rival to Western Union, and 
Western Union was a significant stock owner in several AT&T operating 
companies.118  This was all pretty standard corporate warfare and exactly 
the sort of financial maneuvering that provoked Ripley, Berle, and oth-
ers. 
The new wrinkle was AT&T President Frederick Fish’s argument 
that he had to serve all stockholders, not just one class.  This fit neither 
Coolidge nor Mackay’s view that corporate management should reflect 
the interests of the most powerful insiders (not necessarily majority 
shareholders, but those with enough ownership to claim a seat on the 
board of directors).  Where had Fish come up with his “novel theory” of 
management?  One source was political, the new spirit of antitrust ema-
nating from President Theodore Roosevelt.  Though Fish was not specif-
ic, in the recent Northern Securities case the Supreme Court had dis-
solved this railroad trust under the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Fish seemed 
to be alluding to the case, and antitrust more generally when he reminded 
Mackay that “at the present time it would be a very great mistake for one 
large corporation to have a definite and specific representation on the 
                                                 
 117. FCC Investigation, supra note 1,  p. 41. 
 118. J. WARREN STEHMAN, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY 97–104, 118 (1925). 
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Board of another larger corporation.”  This would “probably be true un-
der any conditions,” Fish continued, “but is . . . of special weight in a 
case like [this] where your company is interested in such a large number 
of other companies, including some of our most aggressive competi-
tors.”119  Fish spoke on the broader issue of concentrated economic pow-
er, the sort that grew out of internal struggles for corporate control and 
ownership, as Berle and Means recognized. 
Fish’s novel move was to step away from the “plutocratic” world of 
corporate power struggles.  In the 1920s, large corporations like AT&T 
would achieve legitimacy by focusing on the technical aspects of opera-
tions and promoting themselves under the umbrella of public service.  
Here, Theodore Vail was a crucial figure.  Once the general manager of 
AT&T, Vail had departed in 1887 but continued to sit on the AT&T 
board.  Before writing to Mackay, Fish consulted Vail, who replied with 
the language of fiduciary trusteeship: “I have always considered myself 
as a representative of all the stockholders.  I do not understand that Mr. 
Mackay has any interests . . . not common to all stockholders.”  Vail may 
have been somewhat disingenuous, as he apparently had once agreed to 
act as Mackay’s agent at AT&T.120 
In 1907, Vail replaced Fish as AT&T president and effectuated a 
compromise with the Department of Justice, ending the threat of an anti-
trust suit.  Vail also purchased Western Union, aligning for a time the 
telephone and telegraph giants, and spurning Mackay’s offer of such an 
alliance with Postal Telegraph.  At the same time, Vail began to extend 
AT&T stock to small investors.  As AT&T shareholders grew into the 
hundreds of thousands, never again would a Clarence Mackay have 
chance to threaten control of the firm.121 
Consistent dividends, dispersed ownership, and the negation of in-
sider control all defined the new “socially responsible” AT&T.  Vail paid 
shareholders a steady 8% dividend per year after 1907.  At the time, pub-
lic utilities usually offered low, if dependable dividends.  AT&T offered 
high and dependable dividends, a policy that assured small investors a 
                                                 
 119. FCC Investigation, supra note 1, at 42. 
 120. Id. at 41.  Vail wrote to Fish, “[a]s to the individual interest in certain of the shares stand-
ing in my name, that is a personal matter between Mr. Mackay and myself . . . which I will not go 
into.”  Id. 
 121. Vail’s return was at the behest of investment bankers lead by J. P. Morgan.  Morgan did 
not challenge Mackay through common stock.  Instead, he acquired some $150,000,000 in AT&T 
convertible bonds, and from such financial heights exerted considerable control over firm manage-
ment.  When it came to stock ownership, AT&T was soon in a position to promote its shares directly 
to the public without investment bankers.  This move fit well with the sentiments that Vail had ex-
pressed in the Mackay matter: managers represented the interest of all stockholders.  This was much 
easier to maintain when there were many small and diverse investors, than when there were a few 
dominant investors, or even a few large minority holders. 
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predictable stream of income, while limiting insider manipulation of as-
sets.122  Rather than serving the interests of large investors or investment 
bankers, AT&T adapted the sort of financial policy that soon earned it 
the well-deserved reputation as the “widows and orphans stock.”  By 
1921, more women than men owned AT&T shares and 78% of AT&T’s 
stockholders owned twenty-five shares or less.123  So long as AT&T 
maintained broad stock distribution and kept out special classes of large 
investors (such as Mackay), it would be able to keep its rates low enough 
to stave off government regulators, while still attracting sufficient capital 
for the large capital needs of telecommunications. 
Few firms in the United States went quite so far as AT&T in con-
necting their financial policies to a publicly enlightened operating strate-
gy, but the company’s wide stock distribution fit the pattern of dispersed 
ownership that Berle and Means identified.  AT&T also became an ex-
ample that Dodd would point to, whereby the dispersal of shareholder 
power led logically to a law of corporations that stressed the broader so-
cial purpose and duties.124  Although, AT&T was the exception, rather 
than the rule. 
THE LEGACY OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 
The original message of The Modern Corporation was lost when 
commentators shifted their reading of the book to principal-agent conflict 
and reduced corporate responsibility to just one issue—maximizing 
shareholder value.125  Modern financial theory starts from the position 
that the capital structure and distribution of rewards inside the firm can 
be set ex ante.  To the extent that this is true, it is true precisely because a 
combination of financial market reform and self-reform by corporations 
                                                 
 122. For a discussion of Vail’s policies in this regard, see ROBERT GARNET, THE TELEPHONE 
ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE BELL SYSTEM’S HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876–1909, at 166 
(1985). 
 123. AT&T, 1921 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (1922).  Thirty-seven percent of AT&T stockholders 
owned five shares or fewer. 
 124. Dodd actually quoted Owen D. Young of General Electric on this point, but GE and 
Young, like AT&T and Vail and Vail’s successors, was a corporation that took social responsibility 
and stakeholders very seriously.  Vail expressed this interlocking series of policies in a number of 
places, such as his extensive and highly informative letters to stockholders in AT&T’s Annual Re-
ports, as well as his numerous public speeches.  See, e.g., T. N. Vail Articles, 1909–1919, “An Ad-
dress before the Greater Vermont Association,” (May 13, 1915) (on file at AT&T Archives, box 
1091). 
 125. Agent in the sense it would have been understood by men like Clarence Mackay and T. 
Jefferson Coolidge had a much less benign ring to it than it does in principal-agent theory.  The 
agent was the director who did the bidding of those with sufficient power to place the agent in that 
position in the first place.  The problem, as Vail and AT&T understood, was to free the corporation 
from just these sorts of exploitative relationships, so that it could go on to become a value creating 
enterprise that profited the entire population of shareholders. 
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greatly reduced the sort of unequal shareholder power that had existed 
earlier.  The conditions that make it possible for shareholders not to wor-
ry about insiders have depended on the sort of disinterested corporate 
management that financial economists now criticize. 
In their exclusive focus on principal-agent conflict, contemporary 
economists risk recreating exactly the sort of internal corporate power 
struggles that existed in Berle and Means’ day.  The exclusive focus on 
owners and managers in principal-agent theory typically results in solu-
tions that place control firmly in the hands of the “active insiders.”126  
Such cures for the (supposed) disease of professional management reflect 
an ignorance about the myriad ways control was exercised historically in 
corporations, ways that Berle and Means went to such lengths to illu-
strate.  The recent waves of insider scandal and abuse—with Enron just 
the most spectacular—are a perfect illustration of how pay tied to per-
formance completely fails to address the problem of power derived from 
control, a power that can manipulate all the supposed objective structures 
and information sources on which financial measurement and perfor-
mance depend.127 
If it seems ironic that a management incentive system (which seeks 
to eradicate principal-agent conflict) ends up creating a new, and perhaps 
even worse forms of insider abuse, this would not have surprised Berle 
and Means.  They understood the issue was control, and not any one par-
ticular way in which control was exercised.128  They also understood 
there was no way to separate the power exercised inside corporations 
from the power corporations exercised beyond their walls.  In attempting 
to “discipline” management by connecting managerial behavior to finan-
cial market performance, modern economists have succeeded in unleash-
                                                 
 126. Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon & Bernard Yeung, in Corporate Governance, Econom-
ic Entrenchment and Growth, 30 (NBER Working Paper No. 10692, 2004), point out that pyramids 
and other methods of control that do not involve dispersed shareholder/managerial discretion model 
can be as bad or worse as agency and power problems with the dispersed owners /managerial discre-
tion model. 
 127. Enron and related corporate scandals are the most spectacular, but the use of stock op-
tions—another agency theory inspired “reform”— is a more general example.  In theory, stock op-
tions merely provide motivation for efficient and profitable management, but in practice the insider 
power of managers allows them to manipulate the options so they make money no matter corporate 
performance. 
 128. Hessen makes the case that Berle and Means’ book influenced the securities reforms of 
the New Deal, with their emphasis on full disclosure, transparency and their monitoring of financial 
relationships between bankers, large stock holders and corporate management.  These reforms would 
have helped to re-empower shareholders and presumably hold managers to account while limiting 
concentration.  Hessen, supra note 9, at 281.  The breaking up of insider groups combined with 
social and regulatory discipline of managers avoided Enron-type problems in America in the 1940–
1980 period. 
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ing the sort of asocial corporate creature that Berle in particular warned 
against.  Shareholders are now defined as those only interested in the 
most that they can get for their shares, rather than citizens responsible for 
the behavior of the corporations they own.  Managers without property, 
who claim to be maximizing shareholder value can, if they wish, dis-
claim all other social obligations.  And no one focuses on the issue of 
control, the central point of Berle and Means’s book. 
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TABLE 1: SHAREHOLDER DATA OF TOP 200 U. S. CORPORATIONS, 1929-30 
Average Number Shareholders of Top 50 Corporations 
(by assets; excludes Ford, AT&T, and five others with no share-
holder data) 
 
Average Number Shareholders, Top Fifty Industrials 
(by assets; excludes Ford and others with no data) 
 
Median Number of Shareholders, Top 20 Non Industrials 
 
Median Number of Shareholders, Top 20 Industrials 
 
Average Number Shareholders of Top 100 Corporations 
(by shareholders) 
 
Average Number Shareholders of Top 100 Industrials 
(by shareholders) 
 
Median Number of Shareholders Top 100 Corporations 
(by shareholders) 
 
Median Number of Shareholders Top 100 Industrials 
(by shareholders) 
 
Median Number of Shareholders, Top 75 Industrials 
(by assets) 
 
Median Number of Shareholders, 151 Large Companies 
(by assets) 
 
Source: ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS 
OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 644–50 (Belknap Press, 1990); BERLE & 
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TABLE 2: TOP 20 SHAREHOLDERS 
Corporation # of SHs 1929 % Ownership Top 20 
Shareholders 1937–38 
American Telephone 





Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 196,119 3 
Swift & Co. 47,000 9 
Continental Can Co. 6,100 9.3 



















Atlantic Refining Co. 19,000 11.2 
Texas Corp. 65,898 11.7 
Radio Corp. of America 60,000 12.2 




Armour & Co. 80,000 13.6 



















B. F. Goodrich Co. 15,000 15.6 
Union Oil Associates 13,712 15.7 
National Biscuit Co. 19,881 15.8 







American Rolling Mill  10,113 16.1 
Pullman Inc. 30,162 17.1 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 31,009 18.4 
Anaconda Copper Corp. 95,050 18.5 
Chrysler Corp. 36,000 19.3 






Wilson & Co. 9,800 20 
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Proctor & Gamble Co. 14,581 20.3 
American Tobacco Co. 30,459 20.5 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 75,876 20.6 






























National Lead Co. 9,786 31.1 




Phelps Dodge Corp. 3,359 32.9 






General Motors Corp. 189,600 38 












E. I. Du Pont de Ne-

















Deere & Co. 4,451 52.6 






See Table 1; and George Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Econom-
ics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & Econ. 237–68, app. (1983) 
Median % Ownership Top 20 Share-
holders 
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TABLE 3: SHAREHOLDERS WITH MORE THAN 5,000 SHARES IN 250 LARGE 
CORPORATIONS, 1929-30 
Average # Shareholders > 5,000 Shares 77 




Source: ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF 
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 644–50 (1990); BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 86–105 (1932); RAYMOND W. 
GOLDSMITH, ET. AL., THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST 
NON FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 242 Nos. 1, 7; 254-69 (1940). 
 
